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ABSTRACT 
This Article presents the results of a survey of jurors in federal 
and state court on their use of social media during their jury 
service. We began surveying federal jurors in 2011 and reported 
preliminary results in 2012; since then, we have surveyed several 
hundred more jurors, including state jurors, for a more complete 
picture of juror attitudes toward social media. Our results support 
the growing consensus that jury instructions are the most effective 
tool to mitigate the risk of juror misconduct through social media. 
We conclude with a set of recommended best practices for using a 
social-media instruction. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Born out a common-law tradition and guaranteed by the U.S. 
Constitution, the impartial jury is one of the most fundamental American 
institutions. It is also one of the most resilient. The impartial jury has 
survived the telephone, the radio, the automobile, and the television.1 There 
is no reason why it cannot survive Facebook and Twitter, too. But to ensure 
the continued fairness and integrity of the jury system, the legal profession 
must be proactive and vigilant in addressing juror misconduct through 
social media.2  
In mid-2011, against a rise in reported instances of juror 
misconduct through social media, U.S. District Court Judge Amy St. Eve 
began an informal survey of actual jurors. The survey asked jurors at the 
conclusion of their service whether they had been tempted to communicate 
about the case through social media and, if so, what prevented them from 
doing so. Based on 140 responses from jurors in federal court, we reported 
in a March 2012 article that the survey data supported the growing 
consensus in the legal profession that courts should specifically instruct 
jurors not to use social media to communicate about the case.3  
In this Article, we introduce 443 additional responses from jurors in 
both federal and state court, and revisit the informal survey results anew, 
with assistance from an additional co-author. Part I discusses social-media 
developments since our last article and highlights three recent judicial 
opinions. Part II presents the results of the informal survey. As we explain 
in Part III, the results continue to support the emerging consensus that jury 
instructions are the most effective tool to mitigate the risk of juror 
misconduct through social media. Although the informal survey results are 
not scientific, we hope that they will further the dialogue by adding the 
voices of actual jurors. 
                                                      
1 See, e.g., Catharine Skipp, Jurors’ TV Viewing Is Growing Issue, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 29, 1989, at B1 (describing potential effects of both television and movies on 
juror sympathies); Jurors Forbidden To Listen On Radio, WASH. HERALD, Oct. 24, 
1922, at 8 (covering “the first time in history” that jurors were instructed not to 
listen to the details of a trial being broadcast on radio). 
2 State v. Smith, No. M2010-01384, 2013 WL 4804845, at *9 (Tenn. Sept. 10, 
2013) (“The American judicial system ‘depends upon public confidence in the 
jury’s verdict.’” (quoting United States v. Siegelman, 640 F.3d 1159, 1186 (11th 
Cir. 2011)). 
3 See Hon. Amy J. St. Eve & Michael A. Zuckerman, Ensuring an Impartial Jury in 
the Age of Social Media, 11 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 1 (2012). 
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I. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN SOCIAL MEDIA 
A. The Revolution Continues 
Social media has continued to grow in both usage and influence.4 
More than ever, Americans of all ages are joining and using Facebook, 
Twitter, LinkedIn, and other social networks.5 George H.W. Bush, for 
example, recently became the third U.S. President on Twitter.6 Facebook 
now has more than 1.1 billion users who, every minute, post 243,000 photos 
to the network, up from 208,000 a year ago.7 Twitter’s expanding user base 
now “tweets” 350,000 comments every minute, up from 100,000 a year 
ago.8 And every minute, 120 new LinkedIn accounts are created, up from 
100 a year ago.9 These dizzying numbers are just the tip of the iceberg—
there are hundreds of other social networks, and new ones are popping up 
all of the time.10  
                                                      
4 Anthony Carranza, Social Media Networking Stats and Trends in 2013, 
EXAMINER.COM (Oct. 14, 2013), http://www.examiner.com/article/social-media-
networking-stats-and-trends-2013; see also Ryan Holmes, 5 Predictions for Social 
Media in 2014, CNNMONEY (Dec. 10, 2013, 12:44 PM), 
http://tech.fortune.cnn.com/2013/12/10/social-media-2014 (predicting that “upstart” 
social networks will “catch fire”); Shea Bennetet, Social Media Growth 
Worldwide—2 Billion Users By 2016, Led by India, MEDIA BISTRO (Nov. 19, 2013, 
3:00 PM), http://www.mediabistro.com/alltwitter/social-media-growth-
worldwide_b51877 (“[T]he huge opportunity to recruit new users in less-developed 
markets [will] ensur[e] that the social networking uptick will continue for years to 
come.”). 
5 See Drew Desilver, Chart of the Week: A Minute on the Internet, PEW RESEARCH 
CENTER (Nov. 27, 2012), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2013/11/27/chart-
of-the-week-a-minute-on-the-internet (“Keeping up with what people do online is 
no easy task . . . .”); Belle Beth Cooper, 10 Surprising Social Media Statistics That 
Will Make You Rethink Your Social Strategy, FASTCOMPANY (Nov. 18, 2013, 5:52 
AM), http://www.fastcompany.com/3021749/work-smart/10-surprising-social-
media-statistics-that-will-make-you-rethink-your-social-stra (reporting that baby 
boomers are one of the fastest growing demographics on social media). 
6 Chris Taylor, George H.W. Bush is Third U.S. President to Join Twitter, 
MASHABLE (Dec. 10, 2012), http://mashable.com/2013/12/10/president-bush-
twitter. The other two are Presidents Obama and Clinton. Id. 
7 Desilver, supra note 5. 
8 Id. 
9 Id. 
10 See, e.g., Nick Bilton, Teenagers Prove Fickle When Choosing Social Networks, 
N.Y. TIMES BITS BLOG (Oct. 26, 2013, 12:07 PM), 
http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/10/26/teens-prove-fickle-when-choosing-their-
favorite-social-network (discussing changing attitudes about particular social 
networks); Adrienne Erin, New Social Networks You Didn’t Know About (Until 
Now!), AL.COM (July 15, 2013, 12:24 PM), http://www.al.com/living/index.ssf/ 
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The legal profession continues to embrace social media, but it has 
been forced to confront difficult questions.11 What are the limits on 
researching a juror through social media?12 Can a judge have a social-media 
profile?13 What is the evidentiary value of a Facebook “like”?14 Can social-
media activity give rise to personal jurisdiction?15 How can courts best 
manage increased public awareness of judicial proceedings?16 These and 
other important questions have not stopped social media from taking hold in 
                                                                                                                         
2013/07/new_social_networks_you_didnt.html (discussing “Srgrouples,” 
“NextDoor,” and “Path”); Bob Al-Greene, 10 Hot Social Networks to Watch, 
MASHABLE (May 29, 2013), http://mashable.com/2013/05/29/10-hot-social-
networks (discussing “Medium,” “Kleek,” “Viddy,” “RunKeeper,” “Ghost,” 
“Pose,” “Vine,” “Atmospheir,” “Days,” and “App.net”). 
11 E.g., Nancy L. Ripperger, Ethics: Facebook—Friend or Foe? What Are the 
Ethical Risks of Using Facebook in Your Litigation Practice?, PRECEDENT 
MAGAZINE, Summer 2013, at 36–38, available at http://www.mobar.org/ 
uploadedFiles/Home/Publications/Precedent/2013/Fall/facebook.pdf. 
12 See, e.g., Michelle Celarier, Ex-SAC Exec’s Defense Probes Jurors’ Social Media 
Postings, N.Y. POST (Nov. 18, 2013, 11:57 PM), http://nypost.com/2013/11/18/ex-
sac-execs-defense-probes-jurors-social-media-postings (reporting on a jury 
consulting firm “doing an extra level of due diligence on prospective jurors by 
Googling their names, checking out their social-media profiles and looking into 
public sites for asset searches”). 
13 Yes, according to ABA Formal Opinion 462 (Feb. 21, 2013), available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/ 
professional_responsibility/formal_opinion_462.authcheckdam.pdf. A related 
question is whether judges and lawyers may connect to each other on social media. 
See Jane Musgrave, Florida High Court Asked to Decide Whether Judges, Lawyers 
Can Be Facebook Friends, PALM BEACH POST (Jan. 16. 2013, 7:29 PM), 
http://www.palmbeachpost.com/news/news/crime-law/state-high-court-asked-to-
decide-whether-judges-la/nTyhj. 
14 See, e.g., Ebersole v. Kline-Perry, No. 12-CV-00026, 2012 WL 3776489, at *5 
(E.D. Va. Aug. 29, 2012) (“The greater the number of ‘likes’ on the page, the more 
likely it is that others visited the page . . . . The evidence was therefore relevant as 
to how widely disseminated the letter was . . . .”). 
15 See, e.g., NobelBiz, Inc. v. Veracity Networks, LLC, No. 13-CV-02518, 2013 
WL 5425101, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 27, 2013) (rejecting broad-based argument that 
“all activity on social media sites is a form of advertising subjecting the account 
holding to personal jurisdiction wherever his or her social media account may be 
viewed”). 
16 See, e.g., Douglas Dowty, Rick Springfield Mistrial a First for Social Media’s 
Impact in Central New York, SYRACUSE.COM (Nov. 20, 2013, 3:23 PM), 
http://www.syracuse.com/news/index.ssf/2013/11/social_media_a_whole_new_ 
game_in_cases_like_rick_springfield_mistrial.html (reporting on a mistrial 
declared during deliberations after new evidence surfaced from a social-media site, 
corroborating the plaintiff’s claims). 
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law offices and courthouses across the country.17 According to a recent 
report, 80 percent of the nation’s largest law firms have blogs;18 many of 
them are also on Facebook and other social networks.19 Eighty-one percent 
of lawyers use social media.20 Federal and state courts increasingly do 
too21—are you following @illinoiscourts on Twitter?  
B. The Threats to Jury Impartiality Remain 
In our prior article, we explained how social networking by jurors 
carries with it the dangerous potential to undermine the fundamental 
fairness of jury trials.22 This potential, unfortunately, continues to become 
reality in myriad reported cases.23 In our previous work, we offered 
                                                      
17 See Simon Chester & Daniel Del Gobbo, Social Media Networking For Lawyers: 
A Practical Guide to Facebook, LinkedIn, Twitter and Blogging, LAW PRACTICE 
MAGAZINE, Jan.–Feb. 2012, at 28, available at http://www.americanbar.org/ 
publications/law_practice_magazine/2012/january_february/social-media-
networking-for-lawyers.html (“What a difference five years makes. Social media 
has exploded.”). 
18 See Adrian Dayton, You Read It Here: Blogs Never Sleep, NATIONAL LAW 
JOURNAL (Sept. 16, 2013, 12:00 AM), http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/ 
PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202619190022. 
19 See generally GUY ALVAREZ, BRIAN DALTON, JOE LAMPORT & KRISTINA 
TSAMIS, THE SOCIAL LAW FIRM: AN ASSESSMENT OF THE USE OF SOCIAL 
TECHNOLOGIES AT AMERICA’S LEADING LAW FIRMS (2013), available at 
http://good2bsocial.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/THE-SOCIAL-LAW-
FIRM.pdf. 
20 See Stephen Fairly, ABA Survey Says Lawyers Getting Clients Via Social Media, 
NATIONAL LAW REVIEW (Aug. 29, 2013), http://www.natlawreview.com/article/ 
aba-survey-says-lawyers-getting-clients-social-media (citing ABA LEGAL 
TECHNOLOGY SURVEY REPORT (2013)); see also Nicole Black, Lawyers Get 
Creative With Use of Social Media, SUI GENERIS (Oct. 8, 2013, 2:27 PM), 
http://nylawblog.typepad.com/suigeneris/2013/10/lawyers-get-creative-with-use-of-
social-media.html. 
21 See generally CONFERENCE OF COURT PUBLIC INFORMATION OFFICERS, 2013 
CCPIO NEW MEDIA SURVEY (2013), available at http://ccpio.org/wp-
content/uploads/2012/09/2013-New-Media-Survey-Report_CCPIO.pdf. 
22 See St. Eve & Zuckerman, supra note 3, at 9. Social media creates problems 
elsewhere in the justice system too. See, e.g., James Staas, Man Convicted of 
Witness Intimidation After Grand Jury Testimony Is Posted on Facebook, BUFFALO 
NEWS (Oct. 30, 2013, 2:38 PM), http://www.buffalonews.com/city-region/erie-
county-court/man-convicted-of-witness-intimidation-after-grand-jury-testimony-is-
posted-on-facebook-20131030. 
23 E.g., Naomi Martin, Juror in David Warren Trial Was Booted Because He Used 
Social Media, NOLA.COM (Dec. 6, 2013, 9:30 AM), http://www.nola.com/crime/ 
index.ssf/2013/12/juror_in_david_warren_trial_wa.html; Mark Pearson, When 
Jurors Go ‘Rogue’ on the Internet and Social Media, JOURNLAW (May 30, 2013, 
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numerous examples; now, based on recent reports, we offer even more.24 
These examples are an important reminder that judges and lawyers must 
remain vigilant in their efforts to ensure a fair trial in the age of social 
media.25  
Facebook remains a popular vehicle through which jurors commit 
misconduct. Consider, for example, the juror in Mississippi, who posted on 
Facebook: “I guess all I need to know is GUILTY. lol.”26 Or the juror from 
across the Pond, who posted: “Woooow I wasn’t expecting to be in a jury 
Deciding a paedophile’s fate, I’ve always wanted to F**k up a paedophile 
& now I’m within the law!”27 Another recent example comes from a 
wrongful-death trial in Missouri, throughout which the jury foreperson 
regularly communicated about the case on Facebook.28 Some examples of 
the Facebook communications include: 
• Juror: “Got picked for jury duty.” 
• Juror: “Sworn to secrecy as to details of this 
case. Most importantly . . . the 3:00 p.m. 
Cocktail hour is not observed!” 
                                                                                                                         
2:12 PM), http://journlaw.com/2013/05/30/when-jurors-go-rogue-on-the-internet-
and-social-media. 
24 Published reports, of course, do not capture every instance of juror misconduct. 
Some of it goes undetected or cannot be proved. See, e.g., Kervick v. Silver Hill 
Hosp., 72 A.3d 1044, 1065 & n.13 (Conn. 2013) (rejecting claim that juror posted 
comments online about the trial where the comments were posted anonymously and 
there was no reliable evidence that a real juror actually posted them during trial). 
25 Cf. Martin, supra note 23 (“Use of social media by jurors in trials has become an 
increasing concern for judges and lawyers around the country. The worry is jurors 
will be exposed to information about the case that they are prohibited from 
seeing—such as news accounts that contain information not admitted in court—and 
that they will share information about the trial, which they are prohibited from 
doing while they are serving on the jury.”). 
26 Shaw v. State, No. 2011-KA-01536-COA, 2013 WL 5533080, at *8 (Miss. Ct. 
App. Oct. 08, 2013). The offending jurors also friended a trial witness on Facebook. 
Id. Even so, the appeals court affirmed the trial court’s denial of a motion for 
mistrial. Id. 
27 See Juror Jailed Over Pedophile Facebook Post, METRO NEWS (July 29, 2013, 
5:09 PM), http://metro.co.uk/2013/07/29/juror-jailed-over-paedophile-facebook-
post-3903315; John Aston, Two Jurors Jailed for Contempt of Court Over Use of 
Internet During Trials, THE INDEPENDENT (U.K.) (July 30, 2013), 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/two-jurors-jailed-for-contempt-of-
court-over-use-of-internet-during-trials-8737004.html. 
28 Sylvia Hsieh, Juror’s Facebook Posts May Overturn Wrongful Death Verdict, 
LAWYERS.COM (Feb. 14, 2013), http://blogs.lawyers.com/2013/02/jurors-facebook-
posts-overturn-verdict. The offending juror was jailed for two months for contempt. 
Id. 
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Friend: “If he’s cute and has a nice butt, he’s 
innocent!” 
• Juror: “Drunk and having a great food at our fav 
neighborhood hangout.” 
Friend: “I’m still amazed they allow jurors to nip 
from a flask all day.” 
• Juror: “Starting day 8 of jury service.” 
Friend: “Remember nice ass = innocent!” 
• Juror: “Civic duty fulfilled and justice served. 
Now, where’s my cocktail????” 
Friend: “Was it Miss Peacock in the library with 
the lead pipe?” 
• Juror: “Civil case . . . Verdict for the defendants 
. . . . I was the jury forearm . . . . 
deliberations and verdict . . . in under one 
hour.”29 
Not all recent reported examples of misconduct involve Facebook. 
Jurors continue to blog about their jury service,30 like the California juror 
who posted dozens of comments on her personal blog throughout a lengthy 
trial.31 One of her early posts said: “[T]his is my secret blog. I don’t know 
how secret it really is though. I want to tell secret jury things.”32 As 
described in other recent reports, a juror discussed the case on a 
newspaper’s online comment board,33 and another did online research about 
a witness and the judge.34 One juror even communicated from her mobile 
                                                      
29 Id. 
30 See, e.g., McNeely v. Cate, No. 11-56393, 2013 WL 5651267 (9th Cir. Oct. 17, 
2013) (considering a habeas claim based on the jury foreperson’s blog post during 
trial); Figueroa v. Highline Med. Ctr., No. 68272-5-I, 2013 WL 5636674, at *7 
(Wash. Ct. App. Oct. 14, 2013) (summarizing a juror’s blog postings during trial as 
“limited and innocuous”). 
31 People v. Johnson, No. F057736, 2013 WL 5366390 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 25, 
2013).  
32 Id. at *133. The juror apparently posted, among other things, “hypothetical” 
questions related to the case. “At least one of her posts drew a comment from a 
family member who ‘love[d]’ the blogger’s ‘hypothetical question to a case that 
you cannot talk about (let alone blog about).’” Id. (alteration in original). 
33 See Michelle Bowman, States Punish Web-Cruising Jurors, LAWYERS.COM (June 
18, 2013), http://blogs.lawyers.com/2013/06/states-cpunish-web-cruising-juror. The 
trial court found the juror in criminal contempt. Id. 
34 Drew Singer, Juror Misconduct Strikes Again at Jenkens Ally’s Trial, 
LAW360.COM (Oct. 24, 2013), http://www.law360.com/articles/483305/juror-
misconduct-strikes-again-at-jenkens-atty-s-trial. 
72 MORE FROM THE #JURY BOX [Vol. 12 
 
device in plain sight of the judge.35 In that case, the judge noticed “an 
unexpected glow on a juror’s chest while the courtroom lights were dimmed 
during video evidence in an armed-robbery trial.”36 The light, it turned out, 
was from the juror’s cell phone. He was texting.37 
C. Recent Case Law on Jurors & Social Media 
Jurors’ often brazen acts of misconduct have contributed to a 
growing body of case law about jurors and social media. How should trial 
courts respond to possible juror misconduct on social media? What does it 
mean to be “friends” on Facebook? Are there limits on how courts can 
respond? In this Section, we review some recent cases that have addressed 
questions like these. 
1. The Trial Court’s Duty to Investigate—State v. Smith 
In State v. Smith,38 the Tennessee Supreme Court considered how a 
trial court should react when it learns “during a jury’s deliberations that a 
juror exchanged Facebook messages” with a witness.39 The issue arose out 
of a murder prosecution in which Dr. Adele Lewis, a medical examiner 
affiliated with Vanderbilt University, testified for the state.40 Though four of 
the jurors were also affiliated with Vanderbilt, none of them were asked 
during voir dire whether they knew Dr. Lewis.41 After the close of evidence, 
the trial court charged the jury and instructed them to begin deliberations.42 
Problems came to light about an hour later.43 Dr. Lewis informed 
the trial judge that a juror had initiated a Facebook conversation with her.44 
In an email to the judge, Dr. Lewis recounted the conversation: 
[Juror]:  A-dele!! I thought you did a great job today on the 
witness stand . . . I was in the jury . . . not sure if you 
                                                      
35 Oregon Juror Jailed for Texting During Trial, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Apr. 18, 
2013, 10:47 PM), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/oregon-juror-jailed-texting-during-
trial. The judge held the juror in contempt of court and required him to spend the 
night in county jail. Id. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. On the topic of texting, Facebook recently announced that its mobile app will 
allow users to send each other Facebook messages with the ease of texting. See 
Kurt Wagner, Facebook Makes Its Messenger App More Like Texting, MASHABLE 
(Oct. 29, 2013), http://mashable.com/2013/10/29/facebook-messenger-texting. 
38 State v. Smith, No. M2010-01384, 2013 WL 4804845 (Tenn. Sept. 10, 2013). 
39 Id. at *1. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. at *2. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. 
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recognized me or not!! You really explained things so 
great!! 
[Dr. Lewis]:  I was thinking that was you. There is a risk of a mistrial 
if that gets out. 
[Juror]:  I know . . . I didn’t say anything about you . . . there are 
3 of us on the jury from Vandy and one is a physician 
(cardiologist) so you may know him as well. It has been 
an interesting case to say the least.45 
The trial judge told the lawyers about the email at some point, but it 
is unclear when, how, or what discussions took place.46 Deliberations went 
on and the jury found the defendant guilty of first-degree murder, for which 
he was sentenced to life in prison.47 
Before the jury left the courthouse, defense counsel suggested that 
the court examine the juror who communicated with Dr. Lewis.48 The court 
flatly denied the request, being “satisfied with the communication that [it 
had] gotten from Dr. Lewis with regard to the matter.”49 The intermediate 
appellate court affirmed, but the Tennessee Supreme Court reversed.  
In a lengthy opinion, the state high court began by observing that, 
“[l]ike judges, jurors must be—and must be perceived to be—disinterested 
and impartial.”50 This means that the trial court must ensure that jurors 
“base their verdict solely on the evidence introduced at trial.”51 If the trial 
court learns of any inappropriate communications between a juror and a 
third party, it must “assure that the juror has not been exposed to” any 
improper information or influence.52 On the rise of social media, the high 
court acknowledged that technology has “made it easier for jurors” to have 
third-party contacts,53 but explained that “pre-internet” case law provides an 
appropriate framework to address instances of juror misconduct committed 
though social media.54  
Applying these pre-internet principles, the Tennessee Supreme 
Court held that the trial court failed to adequately investigate the “nature 
and extent of the improper communications” between the juror and Dr. 
                                                      
45 Id. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. at *2–*3. 
48 Id. at *3. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. at *4.  
51 Id. 
52 Id. at *5. 
53 Id. at *7. 
54 Id. 
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Lewis.55 The court explained that, after learning of the communication, the 
trial judge “was required to do more than simply inform the parties . . . and 
then await the jury’s verdict.”56 The trial judge should have “immediately” 
conducted a “hearing in open court to obtain all the relevant facts 
surrounding the extra-judicial communication,” including its impact on the 
juror’s “ability to serve as a juror” and whether any improper information 
was shared with other jurors.57 Without such a hearing, the record was 
inadequate and the case was remanded with instructions to conduct a 
hearing.58  
The state high court concluded its opinion with a comment on the 
digital age. Observing that the judicial process depends on public 
confidence in its outcomes, the court cautioned that juror communications 
about a case on social media could erode that confidence.59 More than that, 
the court continued, juror misconduct through social media threatens the 
fundamental American guarantee of a fair trial.60 And so for these reasons, 
the court admonished trial courts “to take additional precautions to assure 
that jurors understand their obligation to base their decisions only on the 
evidence admitted in court.”61 Specifically, the court explained: 
Trial courts should give jurors specific, understandable instructions 
that prohibit extra-judicial communications with third parties and the 
use of technology to obtain facts that have not been presented in 
evidence. Trial courts should clearly prohibit jurors’ use of devices 
such as smart phones and tablet computers to access social media 
websites or applications to discuss, communicate, or research anything 
about the trial. In addition, trial courts should inform jurors that their 
failure to adhere to these prohibitions may result in a mistrial and 
could expose them to a citation for contempt. Trial courts should 
deliver these instructions and admonitions on more than one 
occasion.62 
2. What’s in a Friend?—Sluss v. Commonwealth 
The meaning of a Facebook friendship has become increasingly 
significant as parties begin to cry foul over jurors’ undisclosed Facebook 
                                                      
55 Id. at *9. 
56 Id. at *7. 
57 Id.  
58 Id. at *8. 
59 Id. at *9 (citing St. Eve & Zuckerman, supra note 3, at 12). 
60 Id. 
61 Id. 
62 Id.  
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connections.63 In Sluss v. Commonwealth,64 for example, the Kentucky 
Supreme Court considered the defendant’s claim of juror bias based on, 
among other things, two jurors’ undisclosed Facebook friendships with the 
victim’s mother.65 
The case arose out of the tragic death of eleven-year-old Destiny 
Brewer, who died when Ross Brandon Sluss crashed his truck into a vehicle 
carrying her.66 Sluss, who was intoxicated at the time, was later charged 
with murder and other offenses.67 The case was in the public eye from the 
beginning and community members “took to the internet to discuss the 
incident and the upcoming trial on websites such as Facebook and Topix.”68 
At Sluss’ trial, the jurors were asked during general voir dire if they 
knew the victim or her family.69 Two jurors—call them Juror 1 and Juror 
2—said nothing.70 None of the jurors were asked if they were “Facebook 
friends” with the victim or her family.71 Then, during individual voir dire, 
Juror 1 stated that she had a Facebook account from which she knew only 
that the murder “happened.”72 Juror 2 stated that she was not on Facebook 
and knew nothing of the murder.73 Jurors 1 and 2 sat on the actual jury, 
which found Sluss guilty of murder.74  
Defense counsel later discovered that both jurors were “Facebook 
friends” with the victim’s mother, whose Facebook profile contained 
information about her daughter’s death.75 Counsel proffered screenshots of 
the pertinent Facebook pages to the trial court and unsuccessfully moved for 
a new trial.76 
                                                      
63 See, e.g., W.G.M. v. State, No. CR-12-0472, 2013 WL 4710406, at *1–*4 (Ala. 
Crim. App. Aug. 30, 2013) (rejecting claim of juror misconduct based on 
undisclosed Facebook friendship because (1) juror was never asked about social-
networking relationships during voir dire; and (2) “the status of being a ‘friend’ on 
Facebook does not necessarily equate to a close relationship from which a bias 
could be presumed”). 
64 Sluss v. Commonwealth, 381 S.W.3d 215 (Ky. 2012). 
65 Id. at 217. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. at 218. 
68 Id. at 221. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. 
71 Id. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. at 222. 
74 Id. at 221–22. 
75 Id.  
76 Id. 
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Sluss then appealed to the Kentucky Supreme Court, arguing 
primarily that “the mere fact that each juror was a ‘Facebook friend’ with 
[the victim’s mother] creates a presumption of juror bias and should have 
been disclosed during voir dire.”77 Not so, the court explained: Facebook 
friendships “do not necessarily carry the same weight as true friendships or 
relationships in the community, which are generally the concern during voir 
dire.”78 Some people, like the victim’s mother, have thousands of Facebook 
friends, and the nature of each friendship “varies greatly, from passing 
acquaintanceships . . . to close friends and family.”79 As such, the court 
concluded that “a juror who is a ‘Facebook friend’ with a family member of 
a victim, standing alone, is arguably not enough evidence to presume juror 
bias sufficient to require a new trial”; what matters is the actual nature of 
friendship.80  
Although mere Facebook friendships were not enough, the court 
was troubled by the jurors’ apparent misstatements during voir dire and also 
the trial court’s inadequate investigation of the relationship between the 
jurors and the victim’s mother.81 The state supreme court accordingly 
reversed and remanded, directing the trial court to consider, among other 
things, whether the jurors lied during voir dire about their Facebook usage; 
whether the jurors were, in fact, Facebook friends with the victim’s mother 
and, if so, when they became friends; and the nature and extent of any 
actual friendships between the jurors and the victim’s mother.82 
3. The Limits on Proactive Measures—Steiner v. Superior Court 
Many courts and lawyers now appreciate the challenge of ensuring 
an impartial jury in the age of social media. In the high-profile prosecution 
of Jodi Arias, for example, defense counsel sought an order requiring the 
jurors to reveal their Twitter usernames “so their accounts can be monitored 
for communications about the case.”83 (The court denied the motion.84)  
Some attempts to ensure impartiality, however, have gone too far. 
Take, for example, the judicially imposed restrictions at issue in Steiner v. 
                                                      
77 Id. at 222. 
78 Id.  
79 Id. (explaining further that “Facebook allows only one binary choice between 
two individuals where they either are ‘friends’ or are not ‘friends,’ with no status in 
between”). 
80 Id. 
81 Id. at 223–24. 
82 Id. at 229.  
83 See Motion on Arias Jurors’ Twitter Handles Denied, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Dec. 
4, 2013, 2:02 PM), http://www.myfoxphoenix.com/story/24135483/motion-on-
arias-jurors-twitter-handles-denied. 
84 See id. 
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Superior Court.85 Steiner began as an ordinary tort case in which the 
plaintiff alleged injuries from asbestos in the defendants’ products.86 As the 
case moved towards trial, however, the defendants became concerned that 
jurors would “Google” the plaintiff’s attorney, Simone Farrise, and see 
statements on her website about victories in similar cases.87 After jury 
selection, but before opening statements, the defendants asked the trial court 
to order Farrise to remove those references for the duration of the trial.88 
Farrise objected, but the trial court shared the defendants’ concern and so 
granted their request.89 The court also “admonished the jurors not to Google 
the attorneys.”90  
After trial, Farrise restored her website and then appealed both the 
jury verdict (which was for the defendants) and the trial court’s order 
directed at her website. Though the California Court of Appeal affirmed the 
verdict, it found error in the trial court’s order requiring Farrise to take 
down portions of her website.91 As the appellate court explained, the order 
was overbroad and constituted “an unlawful prior restraint on the attorney’s 
free speech rights under the First Amendment.”92 Prophylactic measures 
directed at a website unrelated to the case went “too far.”93 “Juror 
                                                      
85 Steiner v. Superior Court, 164 Cal. Rptr. 3d 155 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013). There are 
other examples too. E.g., Marceaux v. Lafayette City-Parish Consolidated Gov’t, 
731 F.3d 488, 494–96 (5th Cir. Sept. 30, 2013) (reversing district court’s order 
shutting down a website in advance of jury selection); William R. Levesque, 
Seizure of Juror’s Computer Rescinded, TAMPA BAY TIMES, Jan. 9, 2013, at 1B 
(reporting that a federal judge ordered the U.S. Marshalls to seize a former juror’s 
personal computer after allegations of Internet misconduct arose after her service; 
the judge rescinded the order after the prosecutor raised due process concerns). On 
the limits of the trial court’s investigative power, see, for example, Richard 
Raysman & Peter Brown, Social Media Use As Evidence of Juror Misconduct, 11 
INTERNET L. & STRATEGY 5, 3 (2013). 
86 Steiner, 164 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 157. 
87 Id. at 158. 
88 Id.  
89 Id.  
90 Id. 
91 For the discerning reader who wonders why the trial court’s order was not moot, 
the order was indeed moot, but the appellate court concluded that the public interest 
warranted consideration of the issue. Id. at 160 (“The actual order . . . does raise 
questions as to a trial court’s authority to issue an order restricting an attorney’s 
free speech rights during trial to prevent potential jury contamination. Because any 
order restricting such speech during trial is likely to become moot before [an 
appeal] can be heard, we agree it raises an issue of broad public interest that is 
likely to evade timely review.” (citing Nebraska Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 
539, 546–47 (1976)). 
92 Steiner, 164 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 157.  
93 Id. at 166.  
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admonitions and instructions, such as those given here, were the 
presumptively adequate means of addressing the threat of jury 
contamination in this case.”94  
II. THE INFORMAL SURVEY OF ACTUAL JURORS 
In March 2012, we reported the preliminary results of our informal 
survey of actual jurors.95 We had 140 responses at that time, all from jurors 
in federal court. Now, with 443 additional responses from jurors in both 
federal and state court, we revisit the results anew. As explained below, the 
results show a small but significant number of jurors who were tempted to 
communicate about the case through social media. Almost all of these jurors 
ultimately decided not to do so because of the court’s social-media 
instruction. Even jurors who were not tempted to communicate about the 
case through social media indicated that the court’s instruction was effective 
in keeping their temptation at bay. After briefly describing the survey, we 
turn to the numbers and then share comments from the jurors themselves.  
A. Background on the Survey 
For more than three years, actual jurors in Illinois have been asked 
to complete a short survey at the conclusion of their jury service. The 
survey began with jurors in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District 
of Illinois, and about a year ago expanded to jurors in the Circuit Court of 
Cook County, Criminal Division. All survey responses were anonymous.  
Each participating juror sat in either a federal criminal or civil case 
in the Northern District of Illinois or a state criminal case in Cook County, 
Illinois. The federal cases were presided over primarily by Judge Amy J. St. 
Eve.96 Judge Charles P. Burns presided over all of the state criminal cases. 
In every case, the presiding judge administered a model social-media 
instruction during opening and closing instructions.97 Additionally, in many 
of the longer trials, the judge daily admonished jurors not to communicate 
about the case through social media. 
The survey asked the jurors about their experience and included 
these questions about social-media use during trial: 
                                                      
94 Id. at 157. 
95 See generally St. Eve & Zuckerman, supra note 3. 
96 U.S. District Judge Matthew F. Kennelly presided over some of the early cases. 
97 For the text of the model instructions on which the actual instructions were 
based, see Judicial Conference Committee on Court Administration and Case 
Management, Proposed Model Jury Instructions: The Use of Electronic Technology 
to Conduct Research on or Communicate About a Case (June 2012), 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/News/2012/jury-instructions.pdf. 
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Were you tempted to communicate about the case through any social 
networks, such as Facebook, My Space, LinkedIn, YouTube or 
Twitter? 
 
If so, what prevented you from doing so?98 
The results that follow are not scientific, nor are they intended to 
be.99 Perhaps most significantly, juror participation was voluntary and some 
jurors may not have been candid (though juror anonymity likely encouraged 
candor).100 Despite their informality, the results are nonetheless instructive 
in navigating the social-media minefield. In addition to the numerical tally, 
the results come together to form one of the largest collections of comments 
from actual jurors about social media.  
B. The Results 
To date, 583 jurors have participated in the informal survey, 
representing 358 jurors from federal court and 225 jurors from state court. 
The first question asked the juror whether she was tempted to communicate 
about the case through social media. Jurors from both federal and state court 
overwhelmingly responded in the negative, though a sizable, significant 
minority said “yes” or some equivalent.101 Here is the breakdown: 
 Number Percent 
Total 583 - - 
Not tempted 520 89.19% 
Tempted 47 8.06% 
No Response 16 2.74% 
 
Consistent with the preliminary results we reported in March 2012, 
a significant number of jurors referenced the judge or the judge’s instruction 
as the reason why they did not, or were not even tempted to, communicate 
about the case on social media.  
                                                      
98 The full text of the Jury Questionnaire, together with jurors’ responses, is on file 
with the authors. 
99 See St. Eve & Zuckerman, supra note 3, at 21 & n.114 (acknowledging the 
unscientific nature of the results). 
100 See ROBERT M. LAWLESS, JENNIFER K. ROBBENNOLT, & THOMAS S. ULEN, 
EMPIRICAL METHODS IN LAW 77 (2010) (observing that respondent anonymity is 
likely to increase response rate and accuracy in surveys about “sensitive 
behaviors”). 
101 We observed a slight uptick in the rate of temptation over time. Although no 
hard conclusions can be drawn due to the unscientific nature of this survey, we 
believe this may be an area ripe for future inquiry. 
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Notably, the results from federal and state court are nearly identical. 
We observed almost the exact same rates of temptation and response across 
both forums:  
 Federal State 
 Number Percent Number Percent 
Total 358 - - 225 - -  
Not tempted  317 88.55% 203 90.22% 
Tempted 30 8.38% 17 7.55% 
No Response 11 3.07% 5 2.22% 
 
We also observed similar comments from jurors in both forums. At 
almost identical rates, federal and state jurors told us that the judge or the 
judge’s instruction influenced them not to communicate about the case 
through social media. Jurors across both forums also explained their 
decision to refrain from social media by mentioning their oath, respect for 
the judicial process, and integrity.   
1. Analysis of Responses from Jurors Who Were Tempted 
Across both forums, forty-seven jurors responded that they were 
tempted to communicate about the case through social media. Forty-five of 
the forty-seven tempted jurors said that they ultimately did not succumb to 
their temptation. The two others said nothing either way—one stressed that 
she was tempted to talk about her “experience” and not “content,” and the 
other simply said that she was tempted to communicate with her “family.” 
Asked what “prevented” them from communicating about the case 
on social media, most of the forty-five jurors—forty-one of them—
referenced the court’s social-media instruction. One juror, for example, said 
that she wanted to talk about the case on Facebook, but did not because of 
“the Judge’s orders.” Others similarly made direct references to judge’s 
social-media instruction in explaining what prevented them from giving in 
to their temptation: 
• “Judge told us not to communicate” 
• “The request of the Judge” 
• “The Judge’s orders” (2 jurors) 
• “The Judge” 
• “Direct orders” 
• “I morally thought I should obey the Judge” 
• “The Judge saying not to” 
• “The Judge’s admonishment” 
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• “The Judge’s instructions” 
• “Instructions not to do it” 
• “Your instructions” 
• “Agreement with judge not to do so” 
• “ask[ed] not to” 
• “Judge’s orders and importance to the case” 
• “Nope. The judge was clear about not sharing the 
information” 
• “I was instructed not to, and I tend to do the right 
thing” 
• “I was tempted but told not to, so I follow[ed] the 
rules” 
• “Wanted to but knew I could not” 
• “We were told not to” 
One juror, who likely sat in a longer trial, pointed to the judge’s 
“daily warnings” (underline in original) as the reason for her restraint. 
Repetition was important to another juror, who likewise explained that the 
judge’s “repeated directions not to” communicate about the case on social 
media were effective. 
Other tempted jurors indirectly referred to the judge’s instruction in 
explaining why they did not communicate about the case on social media. 
At least two of them mentioned the “law”—“point of law” and “I have to be 
loyal to the law”—and numerous others pointed to their oath or respect for 
the process: 
• “I took an oath” 
• “My oath” 
• “I follow rules under the oath I made” 
• “I knew it was my duty to fulfill the oath I took before 
the court not to say anything” 
• “My duty as a jur[or] under oath” 
• “Took oath not to communicate” 
• “My oath not to tell” 
• “I took this very seriously and wanted to do what I 
swore I would” 
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• “I swore not to” 
• “I had to remind myself that this is a job and I made an 
oath and was going to follow rules under the oath I 
made” 
• “I was tempted, but my respect for the privilege of 
service as a juror to our Court System prevented me 
from doing so” 
• “I respect the process” 
Consistent with the court’s instructions, others decided not to give 
in to their social-media temptations because they understood that doing so 
would threaten their impartiality. One juror, for example, was tempted by 
Google but stayed offline in order “to keep an open mind.” Other jurors 
explained their decision like this: 
• “I did not want to sway my opinion” 
• “To keep an open mind” 
• “Afraid I would be bias[ed]” 
• “Changing my personal opinion” 
Although no jurors were threatened with contempt, two jurors 
sought to avoid criminal sanctions; in their words: 
• “I didn’t want to ruin the trial or get arrested or 
something” 
• “JAIL” (capitals in original) 
In an apparent recognition of the mistrial that might result, one juror 
decided not to communicate about the case in light of the “time invested of 
all jurors.” Another juror similarly remarked that as the trial went on, her 
temptation diminished because she “then had enough invested not to.” 
2. Analysis of Responses from Jurors Who Were Not Tempted 
The overwhelming majority of jurors—520 or 88.55 percent of the 
sample—reported no temptation to communicate about the case through 
social media. Some were emphatic about it: 
• “No not at all” (nine jurors) 
• “Absolutely not” (three jurors) 
• “No” (underline in original; ten jurors)  
• “No!” 
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Although most jurors responded to the question about temptation by 
stating simply “no” or some equivalent, about seventy jurors went further 
without any prompt and explained why. The comments from these jurors 
are revealing.  
Similar to those from the tempted jurors, the comments from the 
jurors who were not tempted overwhelmingly related to the court’s social-
media instruction. Many jurors explicitly referenced the judge or the 
instruction as the reason for their lack of temptation: 
• “The Judge’s orders” (three jurors)  
• “The Judge asked us not to” 
• “The Judge’s instruction” (two jurors)  
• “The Judge made it pretty clear not to” 
• “The Judge’s order not to discuss the case” 
• “The Judge said not to” 
• “Judge’s admonition to not communicate about the 
case” 
• “instructed not to” 
• “stayed true to my given orders” 
• “Instructed by Judge not to” 
• “I was told not to” 
• “Because the Judge instructed us not to” 
• “The fact that we were not supposed to” 
• “did not want to break the rules” 
• “Jury instructions” 
• “The Judge” 
• “No, Judge said not to!” 
• “You told us not to” 
• “Judge asked us not to go online re: this case” 
• “Judge’s direction” 
• “the reminders from the judge were good all the same” 
• “Followed requests of court not to discuss” 
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• “The warning” 
• “instructions from the Judge” (two jurors)  
• “was instructed not to” 
• “ordered not to look” 
One juror characterized the social-media instruction as a “gag 
order” and explained that she did not discuss the case on social media 
because “there was a gag order prohibiting us from discussing the trial.” 
Two jurors said “the law,” and another remarked that “its against the law” 
to communicate about the case through social media.  
Other jurors’ explanations for their lack of temptation linked the 
social-media instruction to principles of fairness: 
• “The Judge’s instructions and I did not want to 
compromise the case” 
• “Judge’s direction [and] wanted to provide a fair and 
unbiased decision” 
• “[The Judge] instructed us not to look through any 
social networks. Besides, I want to hear and see 
evidence of the case” 
• “My own personal belief but the judge’s orders” 
Some jurors just referenced fairness as the reason for their lack of 
temptation: 
• “Did not want to jeopardize proceeding in any way” 
• “I didn’t want to be biased in the case” 
• “I did not want to compromise the case” 
For a handful of jurors, their lack of temptation and their juror oaths 
went hand-in-hand: 
• “I was sworn to not say anything” 
• “it would have been improper once I was instructed 
not to” 
• “My duty not to do so” 
Others attributed their lack of temptation to something more 
personal: 
• “promise to God” 
• “morally” 
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• “I took this very serious[ly] and kept my mouth shut” 
• “I was not going to undermine the integrity of the 
process” 
• “Civic duty” 
• “My sense of integrity” 
• “Kept an open mind” 
• “did my job” 
• “Respect” (two jurors) 
• “Got home too late to think about going on Facebook 
:)” 
For one juror, refraining from prohibited social-media 
communications was a source of personal pride: “I was proud of the fact 
that we, as a jury, did not discuss the case until it came time for 
deliberations.” For another, it was out of “fear,” presumably another 
reference to being held in contempt for violating the court’s instruction. 
And since jurors, after all, are human, one remarked that “nothing” could 
prevent her from using social media to communicate about the case, 
although she insisted she was not tempted to do so. 
Finally, in reporting no temptation, twenty jurors explained that 
they do not use (or have no interest in ever using) social-networking 
services. Thirteen of them, or 65 percent, were from federal court, with the 
remaining seven jurors, or 35 percent, from state court. Additionally, the 
rate of jurors reporting that they do not use social media increased with time 
in both federal and state court. The comments from these jurors are a good 
reminder that, despite the rise of social media, not every juror is a user. 
Some of their comments include:  
• “not big on technology!” (underline in original) 
• “don’t use any of those” 
• “I don’t use them, except for LinkedIn but I do not 
‘chat’ on the Internet” 
• “don’t use them” 
• “I do not use social networks” 
• “I do not use any of those social networks ever” 
• “don’t use those things much” 
• “I don’t have any accounts” 
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• “I very rarely use these networks” 
• “I don’t use social networks to communicate”  
• “No interest” 
• “I am not on any of those networks. Just follow 
Twitter but do not Tweet” 
• “I don’t really do ‘social networks’” 
• “No, I don’t use that too much” 
• “I don’t ‘social network’ anyway” 
• “don’t use those elect. gadgets” 
• “I don’t use social networks much” 
• “not on social networks” 
• “not interested” 
• “didn’t want to” 
• “don’t use those sites” 
• “don’t have, don’t care” 
• “I don’t use them” 
III. BEST PRACTICES FOR ENSURING AN IMPARTIAL JURY IN THE 
AGE OF SOCIAL MEDIA 
A. Employ a Social-Media Instruction 
The informal survey responses, though unscientific, support the 
emerging majority view that the best way to ensure an impartial jury in the 
age of social media is through carefully crafted jury instructions.102 As 
borne out by jurors in our sample, such instructions can effectively mitigate 
the risks of juror misconduct associated with social media. As dozens of 
jurors told us, they did not communicate about the case on social media 
because of the “Judge’s instruction,” or because “[t]he Judge made it pretty 
clear not to.” 
Unlike more draconian tools like threats of imprisonment and 
blanket technology bans, social-media instructions are more respectful of 
                                                      
102 Christian Nolan, Supreme Court Requires Jury Instruction to Avoid Social 
Media, CONN. LAW. TRIB. (Aug. 9, 2013, 6:22 PM), http://www.ctlawtribune.com/ 
id=1202614781226 (describing the practices of the Connecticut state court system). 
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jurors, and less likely to negatively impact their willingness to serve.103 
Trial judges are intimately familiar with instructing juries and have 
traditionally relied on instructions as the primary defense against 
misconduct.104 There is no reason to deviate now. The law presumes that 
jurors will follow their instructions,105 and in the social-media context, 
scores of actual jurors told us that they actually did.106  
Social-media instructions may not prevent every instance of juror 
misconduct. Instructions are not a silver bullet, but there likely is none; after 
all, the jury system is “fundamentally human”107 and therefore entails a 
“risk of human fallibility.”108 But as experience, studies and our informal 
survey results support, a social-media instruction is a necessary and often 
independently sufficient method to minimize, if not eliminate, the risk of 
juror misconduct through social media. Resolving to employ a social-media 
instruction, however, is only the beginning. There are further questions of 
timing and content.  
B. Instruct on Social Media Early and Often 
Courts should instruct juries on social media early and often. We 
suggest an instruction in the judge’s opening remarks to the jury, as a part 
of the judge’s closing instructions before the jury begins deliberations, and 
daily in trials spanning several days. Indeed, one of the jurors in our sample 
lauded the judge for the “daily” instruction. Another said that she was 
tempted at the beginning but less so over time, which underscores the 
importance of repetition.109  
                                                      
103 See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 577 U.S. 127, 146 (1994) (observing that the 
integrity of our jury system depends on full public participation in the process). 
104 See Steiner v. Superior Court, 164 Cal. Rptr. 3d 155, 163 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013) 
(“It is well established that ‘frequent and specific cautionary admonitions and jury 
instructions . . . constitute the accepted, presumptively adequate, and plainly less 
restrictive means of dealing with the threat of jury contamination.’” (citation 
omitted) (modification in original)). 
105 See Weeks v. Angelone, 528 U.S. 225, 234 (2000) (“A jury is presumed to 
follow its instructions.”). 
106 See supra Part II.B.2. 
107 People v. Marshall, 790 P.2d 676, 699 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990). 
108 Anderson v. Fuller, 455 U.S. 1028, 1033 (1982); see also Rideau v. Louisiana, 
373 U.S. 723, 733 (1963) (Clark, J., dissenting) (“[I]t is an impossible standard to 
require that tribunal to be a laboratory, completely sterilized and freed from any 
external factors.”). 
109 See also State v. Smith, No. M2010-01384, 2013 WL 4804845, at *9 (Tenn. 
Sept. 10, 2013) (“Trial courts should deliver [social-media and Internet-related] 
instructions and admonitions on more than one occasion.”). 
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C. Make the Instruction Effective 
The mere existence of a social-media instruction, without regard to 
content, might be enough for some jurors, as it was for two jurors in our 
sample. One juror said, “I am an honest person so knowing I had rules to 
follow made it easy.” Another juror agreed: “I am a rule follower.” Though 
not unique, jurors of this type are rare.  
For most jurors, the content of the social-media instruction is what 
matters. Our prior article provided some suggestions about effective content 
and highlighted the numerous articles and model instructions that can guide 
the reader on the subject. We take the same approach here, and briefly offer 
some guiding principles.  
1. Hit Social Media on Its Head 
At its core, an effective social-media instruction must appreciate the 
changing nature of the risk and the importance of social media to the 
modern-day juror.110 Social media has become part of Americans’ daily 
lives; many use Facebook, Twitter and other social networks almost 
reflexively, and increasingly from their mobile devices.111 Some jurors may 
not even realize that it is wrong to communicate on social media about the 
case. And given the extraordinary ability to broadcast oneself on social 
media, even one-sided online comments like “I am on jury duty” can invite 
responses and start a conversion.112  
This brave new world of social media “now requires trial courts to 
take additional precautions” to preserve the fairness and integrity of the jury 
system.113 Standard “no communication” instructions will no longer do; 
                                                      
110 See For Modern Jurors, Being On a Case Means Being Offline, NAT’L PUB. 
RADIO (June 24, 2013), http://www.npr.org/blogs/alltechconsidered/2013/06/24/ 
195172476/jurors-and-social-media [hereinafter Modern Jurors]. For a succinct 
discussion of the dangers specific to social media, see, for example, the Tennessee 
Supreme Court’s discussion in Smith, 2013 WL 4804845, at *5–*7, and our prior 
discussion, see St. Eve & Zuckerman, supra note 3.  
111 See Modern Jurors, supra note 110; Maeve Duggan & Aaron Smith, Cell 
Internet Use 2013, PEW INTERNET & AMERICAN LIFE PROJECT (Sept. 16, 2013), 
http://pewinternet.org/Reports/2013/Cell-Internet.aspx (reporting that 63 percent of 
cell-phone users access the internet through their phone). 
112 See Martin, supra note 23 (juror struck for saying she was on the jury in a high-
profile case). As one New Jersey judge put it, even a seemingly innocent Tweet can 
be seen as “an invitation to a conversation.” Modern Jurors, supra note 110.  
113 Smith, 2013 WL 4804845, at *9; see also Steiner v. Superior Court, 164 Cal. 
Rptr. 3d 155, 165 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013) (“The traditional prohibition against 
external communication and outside research must be rewritten to meet the 
demands of the twenty-first century.” (quoting Laura Whitney Lee, Note, Silencing 
the ‘Twittering Juror’: The Need to Modernize Pattern Cautionary Jury 
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courts must explicitly admonish jurors against using Facebook, Twitter, and 
other social media to communicate about the case or their jury service 
during trial.114 Because the social-media world is constantly changing, the 
instruction should use broad language that captures the universe of potential 
digital communications tools at jurors’ fingertips. The resulting social-
media instruction might sound like “something out of a Best Buy catalog” 
(as one news report put it),115 but no matter: Specificity is critical and is 
becoming the new reality in American courtrooms.116  
2. Include a Meaningful Explanation 
In stating why she followed the court’s instruction, one juror in our 
sample pointed out that the judge “explain[ed]” the rule. Another said that 
she “felt the request was justified.” Particularly at a time when restrictions 
on social-media use “might feel like solitary confinement” to some,117 it is 
important to tell the jury why the restrictions exist. It is not because of some 
technical legal formality, but is necessary to ensure the fundamental fairness 
of the trial in a variety of ways. By explaining to the jury the important 
reasons that underlie the rule, jurors are more likely to be invested in 
preserving the integrity of the process and less likely to write off the rule as 
unimportant or unnecessary. 
3. Remind Jurors of Their Oath and Its Importance 
Jurors generally want to do the right thing. They recognize that 
“[j]ury service is a duty as well as a privilege of citizenship,” and that their 
work is essential to the fair administration of justice.118 Some may cringe at 
the prospect of jury duty, but in our experience, nearly all who serve take 
their obligation seriously and find the experience personally rewarding. It is 
thus not surprising that many jurors in the informal survey referenced their 
oaths as the reason they did not communicate about the case on social 
                                                                                                                         
Instructions to Reflect the Realities of the Electronic Age, 60 DEPAUL L. REV. 181, 
186 (2011))). 
114 See, e.g., Kervick v. Silver Hill Hosp., 72 A.3d 1044, 1059 n.11 (Conn. 2013) 
(encouraging all state courts to adopt a model instruction that explicitly covers “all 
types of oral and written communications, including electronic communications 
such as e-mailing, blogging, texting, Twittering, and posting on Facebook and other 
social networking sites”). 
115 See Modern Jurors, supra note 110. 
116 See id. (“[W]hile jurors were once warned not to discuss with others the cases 
they were hearing, warnings to jurors in today’s social media age have become 
much more consistent. Jurors are increasingly hearing what they should not do with 
the devices that connect them to the world.”). 
117 See id. 
118 See Thiel v. S. Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 224 (1946). 
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media.119 Staying true to their oath was personal—a source of “pride” for 
one, a “civic duty” for another, and a matter of “respect” for several others.  
An effective instruction should capitalize on these concepts, 
weaving them into the instruction. Rather than threatening jurors with 
contempt, jury instructions should remind the jurors of their oath and its 
importance, and work in references to civic pride, respect, and democratic 
ideals.120 These concepts resonate with jurors and help them to further 
appreciate their opportunity to “participate in the administration of justice,” 
an opportunity that one scholar has called the “pinnacle of democratic 
participation.”121 
4. Don’t Forget the Basics 
Juror misconduct through social media is a growing concern, but 
not all jurors use social media. Even for the vast majority that do, social 
media is not the only vehicle through which they can commit misconduct. 
One of the jurors in our sample, for example, volunteered that he was not 
tempted to use social media, “but I did want to research the case.” A juror in 
a recent high-profile case in New York admitted to doing just that, and was 
swiftly dismissed from the case (after some stern comments from the 
judge).122 And according to another recent report, an Oklahoma state court 
juror did something much more basic: She drove by the crime scene during 
deliberations.123 The takeaway? Remain vigilant about social media. But 
don’t be blinded by it.  
CONCLUSION 
“The jury system is an institution that is legally fundamental but 
also fundamentally human.”124 There is no perfect solution to the growing 
risk of juror misconduct associated with social media. But there are 
effective ways to mitigate the risk and preserve the fairness and integrity of 
the system. Based on informal survey data from 583 actual jurors, we 
continue to suggest that courts employ specialized social-media instructions 
early and often during trial. Our survey data may be unscientific, but the 
voices of actual jurors speak volumes. They tell us that jurors tend to follow 
                                                      
119 See supra Part II.B.1.  
120 See, e.g., Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, The Joy of Jury Duty, THE ATLANTIC, May 
3, 2013 (“Turning the dread of jury duty into a form of enjoyment begins with 
understanding why jury duty matters.”). 
121 Brian C. Kalt, The Exclusion of Felons from Jury Service, 53 AM. U.L. REV. 65, 
129 (2003). 
122 Singer, supra note 34. 
123 See Wilkerson v. Newton-Embry, No. 09-CV-00251, 2012 WL 2571277, at *3 
(N.D. Okla. July 02, 2012). 
124 People v. Marshall, 790 P.2d 676, 699–700 (Cal. 1990). 
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properly crafted social-media instructions; that jurors generally appreciate 
their critical role in the judicial process; and that these conclusions apply 
with equal force to jurors in both federal and state court. 
